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Animals neither negotiate verbally nor conclude binding contracts,
but nevertheless regularly exchange goods and services without
overt coercion and manage to arrive at agreements over exchange
rates. Biological market theory predicts that such exchange rates
fluctuate according to the law of supply and demand. Previous
studies showed that primates pay more when commodities be-
come scarcer: subordinates groomed dominants longer before
being tolerated at food sites in periods of shortage; females
groomed mothers longer before obtaining permission to handle
their infants when there were fewer newborns and males
groomed fertile females longer before obtaining their compliance
when fewer such females were present. We further substantiated
these results by conducting a 2-step experiment in 2 groups of
free-ranging vervet monkeys in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve,
South Africa. We first allowed a single low-ranking female to
repeatedly provide food to her entire group by triggering the
opening of a container and measured grooming bouts involving
this female in the hour after she made the reward available. We
then measured the shifts in grooming patterns after we added a
second food container that could be opened by another low-
ranking female, the second provider. All 4 providers received more
grooming, relative to the amount of grooming they provided
themselves. As biological market theory predicts, the initial gain of
first providers was partially lost again after the introduction of a
second provider in both groups. We conclude that grooming was
fine-tuned to changes in the value of these females as social
partners.
biological markets  cooperation  economic behavior 
primates  reciprocity
Trading in humans and cooperation in animals are part of acontinuum in which both human and nonhuman agents
usually have to take 3 crucial steps: (i) choose a partner, (ii)
determine how much to invest to obtain the desired commodi-
ties, and (iii) prevent being short-changed by the chosen partner.
While research in economics traditionally concentrates on fac-
tors that determine the price of commodities, quantitative
aspects have gained much less attention in studies of nonhuman
cooperation (1). Over the past decades, cooperation research has
focused mainly on the question of partner control rather than on
the relative values of goods and services exchanged. By contrast,
the biological market paradigm (2, 3) focuses on the link between
steps i and ii and predicts that the law of supply and demand
affects the exchange rates in nonhuman ‘‘trading’’ in a similar
fashion as in human economic exchanges. Here we test this
prediction in 2 wild vervet monkey groups by measuring changes
in grooming patterns after experimentally changing the number
of individuals that could provide food to their group.
We envisage the exchange of commodities in primate groups
as trading on a market with exchange rates fluctuating from day
to day depending on supply and demand. Monkeys trading goods
and services have to agree on exchange rates to avoid overt
conflicts, but lack the option of negotiating verbally and con-
cluding binding contracts. Not all commodities exchanged
among nonhuman primates can be adapted in quantity or quality
during each interaction, but 1 service, grooming, can be adjusted
easily. Grooming can be exchanged against grooming itself, but
also against other goods or services, lending it currency-like
characteristics. Commodities bought with grooming include
tolerance at food sites (4–9), access to newborns (10, 11),
compliance of females (12), and support in conflicts (13–15),
although results on grooming–support exchanges have been
mixed (16–18). Monkeys do not necessarily track value fluctu-
ations for each commodity on the market separately, however,
but they may change their general attitude toward group mem-
bers (19) in accordance with the accumulated value of the
different commodities each one of them has on offer. Mecha-
nistically the value attributed to a partner is likely to be expressed
in physiological parameters such as titers of neurohormones and
neurotransmitters implicated in trust and pair bonding (20–25).
We created an artificial market in 2 groups of wild vervet
monkeys in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve (South Africa) and
caused sudden changes in the market value of a few animals in
such a way that these affected all other group members and could
easily be perceived by them. After an initial phase in which we
gathered baseline data on grooming (phase 0), we allowed a
single low-ranking female in each study group to produce a
bonanza of food for herself and her group members by triggering
the opening of a container (Movie S1) in 16 trials spread over
a period of 9 weeks (phase 1). These first 2 stages resemble a
study previously done in captivity with long-tailed macaques
(26). In that experiment, a single individual that could produce
a small food reward and share it with up to 2 other animals
experienced an increase in social status. We developed this
paradigm further to show the quantitative effects of a shift in
supply on grooming patterns. This requires a manipulation either
of the amount of reward per provider or of the number of
providers. We opted for the latter approach because it is very
hard to control the amount of food each individual will obtain
once the provider made it available. In phase 2 of the experiment
we therefore introduced a second provider in each group,
another low-ranking female with a second food container
(Movie S2) that only she could open. The same amount of food
(5 apples per trial sliced in small pieces) was now divided over
the 2 containers that were made available simultaneously, but
that were not necessarily opened simultaneously. In economic
terms we thus replaced a monopoly by a duopoly. Agents
enjoying a monopoly should obtain stronger leverage over their
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exchange partners than members of a competitive duopoly. This
leads to our main prediction: grooming ratios should increase in
favor of the provider in phase 1 and decrease again with the
introduction of a competitor in phase 2, as depicted in Fig. 1A.
We used the ratio of grooming given relative to grooming
received as our main parameter, because we expected that group
members could pay the providers both by grooming them more
and by demanding less grooming from them.
There is considerable discussion about the function of groom-
ing in primates. A first basic assumption is that grooming entails
a net cost to the groomer and provides a net benefit to the
groomee. In free-ranging groups, grooming is very likely to have
an opportunity cost in the form of lost foraging time and lowered
vigilance (27). Captive animals, in contrast, sometimes groom
excessively, out of boredom, or in the form of a pathological
stereotypy, thus removing the incentives to reduce grooming
payments to a minimum. However, even in the wild primates
groom each other much more than can be explained by its
hygienic function, the most likely ultimate function of allo-
grooming (22). The proximate mechanisms that make monkeys
enjoy being groomed include the release of several neurotrans-
mitters and neurohormones implicated in the brain’s reward
circuit, analogous to the reaction of human subjects to touch (22,
23). Enjoying being groomed is a bit like enjoying eating: the
proximate mechanisms are such that the system easily overshoots
the original ultimate goals. Additional functions may be served,
such as building up fat reserves when eating or strengthening the
bonds between individuals when grooming. In primates the latter
is now probably more important than the hygiene of the fur (22).
The crucial question here is not, however, what the exact
function of grooming is, but whether grooming is sufficiently
costly to underlie market forces, in the sense that animals prefer
grooming another animal shorter rather than longer if the effect
remains the same. We follow the tradition of estimating the
amount of grooming by the length of time a grooming bout lasts.
Although the value of a unit of grooming time may drop as the
grooming bout progresses, it seems safe to assume that longer
bouts have higher value than shorter ones within the same dyad.
Expressing the value of grooming in time units also makes our
results more easily comparable with a recently published formal
market model that used time units to express the value of
services (28). We felt confident that grooming patterns underlie
market forces, because market effects had already been shown
in several studies apart from our own (7–12).
We chose low-ranking females as providers, because lower-
ranking individuals in primate species with clear dominance
hierarchies tend to groom higher-ranking members of their
group more than vice versa (among others, refs. 4, 5, 8, 9, 29, and
30). The reason behind this is that a dominant individual can
offer several resources, apart from grooming, that the subordi-
nate cannot match in value: support in agonistic conflicts,
tolerance at resources, or even simply restraint in aggression. We
therefore expected to see much stronger effects in low-ranking
providers than in high-ranking ones.
What exactly are our providers offering their group members?
Each provider opened a container with enough pieces of apple
to give every group member a good chance of getting hold of
some food in a free-for-all determined mainly by dominance. At






































































































Fig. 1. Mean estimates of the grooming ratios for the food provider. (A) Expected effects. In phase 0 of the experiment each individual has a specific ratio of
grooming received versus grooming given. In phase 1 (monopoly) the grooming ratio of the single food provider should increase (reward for providing). But,
as soon as an additional provider is introduced in phase 2 (duopoly), the grooming ratio of the first provider should decrease again as a consequence of the
increased supply of food providers (market effect). (B–D) Schematic representation of the 3 experimental phases. Probability density (PD) functions are shown
of mean estimates for grooming ratios of nonproviders (blue), first provider (orange), and second provider (red) in phase 0 with no provider (E and H), phase
1 with one provider (F and I), and phase 2 with 2 providers (G and J) for the Donga group (E–G) and the Picnic group (H–J).
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first sight, providers would not seem able to give food to some
members more than to others, which implies that partner control
strategies, such as reciprocal altruism (30) or tit-for-tat (31),
cannot play much of a role. Reciprocal altruism has been
construed in a narrow and in a broad fashion. Models using the
narrow interpretation, which are usually based on variations of
the 2-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma, allow precise predic-
tions about the behavioral contingencies of 2 partners in re-
peated interactions. The few studies in which these predictions
have been tested in primates yielded negative results (32, 33).
This narrow interpretation does not apply to our experiment,
because a priori our providers cannot make a strategic choice
that is simultaneously contingent on behavior of group members
that treated them differently in the previous ‘‘round.’’
In a much broader interpretation, reciprocal altruism encom-
passes all forms of partner control mechanisms in which indi-
viduals reward or punish their partners on the basis of past
behavior. One way in which our providers could give some group
members an advantage over others is by making the timing of
opening contingent on the past behavior of the group members
near the container, assuming that being near gives a competitive
advantage. This way the provider could, to a limited extent,
individualize the commodity offered. This still does not mean
that providers can play dyadic games with all their group
members simultaneously, but they could exert some partner
choice this way. Partner choice is the core mechanism driving
biological markets, but is not taken into account in reciprocal
altruism and other partner control models.
In summary, these considerations lead us to expect (i) baseline
grooming ratios to be skewed in favor of more dominant
individuals, (ii) grooming patterns to change strongly in favor of
the first providers, but to become less favorable again when the
second providers are introduced, and (iii) providers to open the
containers preferably in the presence of those grooming them
most.
Results
The grooming ratio can shift in favor of a provider in several
ways: either the provider can groom less or her group members
can groom her more, or both. It is perhaps easier to adjust a
grooming ratio to one’s own advantage by grooming less than by
persuading the other to groom longer, but this does not warrant
strong predictions about shifts in absolute grooming bout
lengths. We therefore used grooming ratios per dyad, calculated
as time being groomed minus time spent grooming divided by
total grooming time, which yields values between 1and 1. In the
experimental phases, grooming data were recorded during 1 h
after the containers were opened. We had expected to see
changes in grooming patterns before the containers were opened
too, but in practice we could not measure this. Early in the series
of trials the animals were too excited to sit down for a grooming
session with food visible in the closed container and at a later
stage the providers often opened the containers almost imme-
diately, leaving no time for grooming sessions [see supporting
information (SI) Table S1 and SI Text].
In the preexperimental phase 0 we measured baseline groom-
ing ratios, which were highly correlated with the relative rank
difference of the corresponding dyads [Mantel test (ref. 34),
combined probabilities (ref. 35): 2  25.69, P  0.001; see Fig.
S1]; i.e., the larger the rank difference was, the more lopsided the
grooming effort was in favor of the dominant.
The grooming ratios of the providers differed significantly
among the 3 phases (Friedman test, combined probabilities: first
provider, 2  26.25, P  0.001; second provider, 2  18.59, P 
0.001). After showing that the overall experiment yielded a
highly significant result, we proceeded with a number of post hoc
sign tests. The grooming ratios for the first providers in each
group changed according to expectation (Fig. 1 A): the ratio
increased significantly in favor of the provider from the nontest
phase 0 to test phase 1 (single provider: 2  15.25, P  0.01).
Grooming ratios for the first provider dropped significantly
again when the second provider was added in phase 2 (2 
15.25, P  0.01), but remained significantly above the control
values of phase 0 (2  15.25, P  0.01). As expected, the
grooming ratios for the second providers did not change signif-
icantly between phases 0 and 1 [2  3.54, not significant (NS)],
but their ratios shot up when they became providers themselves
in phase 2 (2  15.25, P  0.01). The provider effect was so
strong that it more than counterbalanced the dominance effect.
The strongly negative grooming ratios of the low-ranking fe-
males we measured in phase 0 turned into positive values once
they became providers. To evaluate whether these changes for
providers were indeed outside the range of fluctuations found in
the nonproviders (e.g., because of seasonal changes), we esti-
mated mean changes in grooming ratios for both providers and
nonproviders, using a hierarchical bootstrap resampling proce-
dure to deal with dependencies among dyads (36) (Fig. 1 I and
J). The differences in grooming ratios between the nontest phase
0 and phase 1 were significantly greater for the first providers
than for the group of nonproviders (Donga group, P  0.0001;
Picnic group, P  0.0005; combined probabilities, 2  54.65,
P  0.001). Grooming ratios increased significantly for both
second providers compared to the nonproviders in phase 2
(Donga, P  0.001; Picnic, P  0.040; combined probabilities, 2
 102.72, P  0.001). Comparing grooming differences between
the nontest phase and phase 2, we found a significant difference
between the first provider and the group of nonproviders in the
Donga group, but not in the Picnic group (Donga, P  0.0029;
Picnic, P  0.91; combined probabilities, 2  11.90, P  0.025).
These changes in grooming ratios were not because of a
change in behavior of a few individuals, but were visible in a
broad range of dyadic relationships (Fig. 2). In 13 of 15 dyads the
providers groomed less in an absolute sense, compared to the
preexperimental phase. In 4 dyads, 2 in each group, the non-
providers groomed the providers more. Three of these 4 were
among the 13 in which the nonproviders were groomed less.
We also verified whether providers attempted to give specific
individuals a head start by opening the container preferentially
in their presence. They could be expected to do so for 2 classes
of individuals: (i) long-term friends or kin with whom they had
a positive relationship and (ii) animals that groomed them
specifically in the context of the trials. Providers did not open the
containers preferentially when their preferred grooming part-
ners from phase 0 were nearby (Donga group, Spearman rank
correlation, first provider, rs  0.31, n  9, NS, and second
provider, rs  0.52, n  9, NS; Picnic group, Spearman rank
correlation, first provider, rs  0.13, n  6, NS, and second
provider, rs  0.25, n  6, NS), but in both groups we found,
in phase 1, that an individual that happened to be the nearest
neighbor at the moment of opening was significantly more likely
to groom the provider (single provider: Donga group, 2  33.69,
df  9, P  0.001; Picnic group, 2  13.5, df  6, P  0.036;
combined probabilities, 2  25.06, df  4, P  0.001). During
test phase 2, this effect was also found for the first providers
(combined probabilities for the first providers of both groups: 2
 10.33, df  4, NS), but not for the second providers (combined
probabilities for the second providers: 2  6.38, df  4, NS).
Thus, the first providers were likely to be engaged in grooming
sessions with individuals that were near the container when it
opened and thus probably got more food than latecomers (see
SI for details of statistical tests).
Discussion
In agreement with an earlier study (26), we found that grooming
ratios shifted to the advantage of female vervets that produced
food bonanzas. Our crucial result, however, lies in the quanti-


















tative shifts of the exchange rate between grooming and pro-
viding food: the positive effect on the grooming ratios of the first
providers was roughly half as strong after we added a second
provider in each study group, confirming a central tenet of
biological market theory (2, 3, 28). Similar market effects have
hitherto been reported only for primates exchanging grooming
for access to naturally occurring commodities (4, 5, 8–12).
Grooming ratios were adapted rather quickly to changing
circumstances and we therefore assume that this reflects stra-
tegic behavior that forms part of the natural repertoire of
vervets. Allowing some animals to produce food sources for
themselves and their group members by opening a container is
obviously rather artificial. However, it is not necessarily uncom-
mon or unnatural for a primate group to gain access to a large
food source because of a single group member. Two phenomena
come to mind: animals giving a food call after finding a large
resource (37–40) and experienced ‘‘leaders’’ (41) guiding their
group to crucial resources (42–44). Neither phenomenon is
found in all primates, or unique to primates, but both are
sufficiently common to make the existence of mechanisms
encouraging food providers likely. Our providers might be
comparable to leaders, which in primates can be high- as well as
low-ranking females (43, 44), because in both cases the same
individual produces a communal resource repeatedly, thus giving
their group members time to recognize their special skills. In all
3 cases, food calls, leading, and our experiment, the animal
producing the resource may act on purely selfish motives.
Leaders and providers may forage for themselves and produce
food for others as a by-product and food calls might be given only
upon finding large and shareable resources to protect the caller
against predators by improving the ‘‘safety-in-numbers’’ (37, 41, 45).
A provider can be expected to open the food container sooner
or later out of pure self-interest, as long as she gets some food
herself without experiencing unusual harassment. Why would
group members pay for something they would obtain by simply
waiting long enough? We assume that vervets, like many other
animals, discount future benefits and value a reward more the
sooner it becomes available (46). In addition there was a clear
opportunity cost of waiting near the closed food container,
because the group could not continue its normal foraging
routine.
It seems reasonable to assume that only a limited amount of
grooming—irrespective of who provides it—is needed to induce
the providers to open their containers. In that case, each of the
nonproviders would have been better off if others provided all
of the grooming needed. The nonproviders would thus be caught
in a collective action dilemma, a situation that resembles the
notoriously unstable n-players prisoner’s dilemma (47). So why
did the whole group change its grooming behavior to the
advantage of the providers or, in other words, how could an
individual willing to groom the provider do better than an animal
that did not groom her?
The provider could make the timing of opening dependent on
the presence or the absence of specific group members. The
providers were indeed reluctant to open their containers in the
presence of high-ranking animals. Providers were also more
likely to be groomed by nonproviders that were near the
containers at the moment they were opened than by nonpro-
viders that were farther away. We see 4, not necessarily mutually
exclusive, interpretations of this phenomenon: (i) those that ate
more during a trial were more inclined to groom, (ii) grooming
improved long-term bonds and the providers preferably opened
the containers in the presence of group members they trusted,
(iii) grooming and opening the container were exchanged in a
reciprocal altruism-like fashion, and (iv) grooming ratios re-
f lected the stress level of the providers rather than their market
value.
(i) Grooming sessions often follow longer periods of foraging.
A simple explanation would therefore be that those with fuller
bellies were inclined to groom more. This can explain more
grooming by those that obtained most of the resource, such as
the provider and others near the container at the moment of
opening, but this cannot explain the shifts in grooming ratios we
observed.
(ii) Nonproviders could have groomed the provider to im-
prove their affiliative bond with her. Candidate neurobiological
mechanisms are those usually connected to trust, pair bonding,
and friendship, such as increased titers of oxytocin, vasopressin,
and endorphins, which notably follow friendly forms of touching
(reviewed in refs. 24 and 25). The attitude toward a group
member can be improved by any good or service received from
that individual, but grooming is the standard service every vervet
has handy.
Grooming to gain trust is reminiscent of a mechanism De
Waal (19) labeled ‘‘attitudinal reciprocity,’’ which is a general-
ized bookkeeping mechanism based on multiple interactions in
which the more recent interactions tend to weigh more than
those from a more distant past. ‘‘Attitudinal partner choice’’
would be a more accurate term in the present case, but the idea
2 0 -2







































Fig. 2. Changes in dyadic grooming ratios. Differences are shown between phase 1 and phase 0 for the Donga group (A) and the Picnic group (C) and between
phase 2 and phase 0 for the Donga group (B) and the Picnic group (D). Individuals are ordered by rank, and 1 equals the highest ranking animal. Rows, groomers;
columns, groomees. Values were calculated by subtracting grooming ratios of phase 0 from those of phase 1 or 2, respectively. As original ratios ranged between
1 and 1, differences could range between 2 (blue, maximum shift in favor of groomer) and 2 (orange, maximum shift in favor of groomee). First providers
are indicated by orange arrowheads and the second producers by red arrowheads.
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remains the same: the animals are assumed to be driven by
emotions reminiscent of those felt by humans toward friends.
(iii) Grooming the provider can also be interpreted as con-
tingent on the provider’s behavior; in other words, the provider
is prepaid in the expectation of returns during the next trial. This
would imply a more accurate form of bookkeeping in the sense
of De Waal’s ‘‘calculated reciprocity’’ (19) and would suggest
cognition to be in the driver’s seat. For this reciprocal altruism-
like mechanism to work the groomers must have been willing to
invest in a future reward that could be reaped 1 or more days
later. Investments in uncertain returns over such long periods
could be beyond the cognitive capacities of monkeys, however
(48). Calculating providers should have been ready to make
spiteful decisions costly to themselves, and also to those who
groomed them, by not opening the container to punish those not
willing to shift the grooming ratio in their favor. The provider
could eventually have punished specific individuals by waiting till
they were at some distance from the container. It is highly
unlikely that our providers used this rather complicated tactic,
however, because they opened the container almost immediately
in the later trials (Table S1).
(iv) An explanation for dynamic changes of primate grooming
patterns that does not invoke the law of supply and demand (10,
49) is based on the idea that the proximity of group members
causes stress to those controlling interesting commodities. More
attention would cause more stress, which in turn would require
more grooming to calm the provider. This stress hypothesis has
notably been suggested for ‘‘baby markets’’: the level of anxiety
of mothers would increase with the number of females vying for
their infants simultaneously and the amount of grooming needed
to calm the mothers would increase accordingly (10, 49). How-
ever, the stress hypothesis also predicts that high-ranking han-
dlers, who cause more stress (50), would have to groom longer
than low-ranking ones. The opposite was found, however (9–11,
29), which makes sense from a market perspective: high-ranking
individuals can compensate low amounts of grooming by offer-
ing tolerance, restraint, and/or support, which all have higher
value the higher ranking the donor is. In our study higher-
ranking individuals also groomed the commodity providers less
than lower-ranking ones. Moreover, in the relaxed period after
the consumption of the reward during which we measured
grooming times, the providers were no longer under extraordi-
nary attention.
The question remains whether the grooming patterns ob-
served after the containers were opened could indeed be
interpreted as rewarding and/or prepaying the providers. Not all
group members groomed providers more; some also accepted
shorter grooming bouts from the providers compared to the
preexperimental phase. Again this makes sense if one thinks in
terms of mechanisms of price setting in a market: during a
grooming session both partners can test their momentary market
value by ending a grooming bout and monitoring their partner’s
reaction. Providers were probably confronted with less dissatis-
faction if they groomed others only briefly, while at the same
time their own signs of dissatisfaction carried more weight. A
price-setting process is dynamic and grooming ratios can thus be
adjusted in several ways: one party grooms less, or the other
grooms more, or both.
In conclusion, the adjustment of grooming ratios can be
understood as a continuous bargaining process in which bar-
gaining positions depend on the perception of the other’s value
as a partner in a long-term perspective. Grooming plays a dual
role in this process: it functions both as a currency, because of
its direct influence on the reward system of the groomee, and as
a commodity, because it can be traded directly for access to
infants, for tolerance, and so forth. Grooming can thus be used
to balance asymmetries in trades of other commodities. In our
experiment this balance shifted suddenly, and grooming patterns
were quickly adjusted, when we experimentally created a mo-
nopoly, and shifted again when we turned the monopoly into a
duopoly. Thus, free-ranging monkeys can accurately adjust to
shifting markets, although they cannot rely on language for
bargaining and have no obvious way of concluding binding
contracts.
Methods
Observer Team. The observer team consisted of the first author and 7 different
assistants: E. van de Waal (September 2005 to January 2006), S. Lemoine
(February to May 2006), V. Dufour and S. Aubel (May and June 2006), E. Hellard
and A. Brotz (June to August 2006), and E. Hellard and D. Carter (September
2006).
Research Area and Subjects. We used 2 free-ranging vervet monkey groups,
Chlorocebus aethiops, in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, Mpumalanga
Province, South Africa. Loskop is located at 180 km northeast of Pretoria,
covers 25,000 ha, is on average 1,000 m above sea level, and consists mainly
of ‘‘bushveld’’ (tall grasses and thick acacia bushes). Winters (May to October)
are dry and cold and summers (November to April) are hot and humid.
Both study groups were habituated to human observers before the start of
the experiments. Their home ranges of 3 km2 each were 3 km apart. The
Donga group had a period of fast turnover of adult males before the study
period but the total group size never exceeded 15. We observed 3–5 adult
males, 7 adult females, 1–2 subadult individuals, and 1–2 infants at a time. The
Picnic group had 2–3 adult males, 4 adult females, 1 juvenile, and 2–6 infants
at a time. The dominance hierarchies remained stable throughout the study
period. For the experiment, we selected the 2 lowest-ranking females that
would accept manipulating the containers as food providers.
Experiment Protocol. The experiment had 3 phases: a period without a pro-
vider (phase 0, September 2005 to April 2006, 221 observational sessions for
the Donga group and 191 for the Picnic group, of which we randomly chose
55 sessions per group for analysis), a period with 1 provider per group (phase
1, May to June 2006, 16 trials per group, always the same female as a provider),
and a period with 2 providers per group (phase 2, August to September 2006,
22 tests per group, the same first provider plus a second one). Both experi-
mental phases were preceded by a period of training in which the providers
learned to touch the lid of their specific food container.
The groups were followed every second day during phase 0 and 2 days in
a row every 4 days during the 2 testing phases 1 and 2. In phases 1 and 2 we
waited until the animals reached a suitable area (open with big trees nearby
for the vervet monkeys to rest safely) before positioning the food container.
After a provider opened the container, we recorded all grooming interactions
within the following 60 min. Each approach to and opening of the containers
by the providers was recorded with digital video cameras (Samsung VP-D361i
and Panasonic NV-GS11). One observer (C. Fruteau) continuously followed the
provider while 2 assistants recorded the interactions of the rest of the group.
All agonistic and affiliative interactions were recorded continuously (51) and
the distance between every visible vervet and the experimental containers
was recorded in 30-s intervals. Grooming bouts were timed to the nearest
second. A bout was considered to have ended when either the direction of
grooming changed or there was a break of 20 s. A trial was aborted if 1 or both
of the providers did not open their container during 1 h, which happened 5
times in phase 2 for the Donga group and once in phase 2 for the Picnic group.
The procedure for phase 2 was identical to the trials in phase 1, except that 2
containers were placed simultaneously at 2 m distance from each other
(Movie S2). The reward was the same as in phase 1 and evenly distributed over
the 2 containers. Both providers were followed by 1 observer, each, while a
third observer recorded the interactions between the remaining members of
the group.
Observations were distributed throughout the day but the majority of the
data were taken from 6 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. We used
Pendragon Forms (professional edition 4.0.00) on Palm Zire 31 handheld
computers for all behavioral data. Births, immigrations, disappearances, and
intergroup encounters were recorded on a daily basis.
Food Containers. We worked with 2 containers (50  55  15 cm) with wooden
frames that were both covered with a plastic mesh on all sides and reinforced
with a metallic grid on top, allowing the vervets to see and smell the food (Fig.
S2A and Movie S1). The second container stood on 50-cm legs and had a split
bottom, causing the food to drop to the ground (Fig. S2B and Movie S3). The
containers were filled with a total of 5 chopped apples per test. This was
sufficient to ensure that most adults got a share. The obvious differences in


















form and color made it easy for both providers and nonproviders to attribute
a specific device to a specific provider. The containers were unlocked by
remote control (a car door locking device) as soon as the provider touched
the lid.
Training of Providers. To habituate all animals to the food containers and to
train the providers to operate them, we conducted a training phase with 24
trials per group from October 2005 to mid-January 2006 for the first providers
and a training phase with 12 trials per group for the second providers in July
2006. We provided 5 chopped apples per trial and we opened the container by
remote control as soon as the selected provider touched it. The trials were not
time restricted; i.e., we waited until the providers dared to come and open
their container. During the first training phase, dominant individuals tried to
monopolize the food as soon as the container was opened, which led to
serious harassment of the low-ranking providers. We placed 2 extra apples
(also cut into pieces) outside the container as soon as the provider had opened
the container to reduce this harassment. This additional food supply was not
necessary for the second training phase, where harassment of the providers
was much lower. It took only 1 trial for 3 of the providers to come to touch the
container by chance. The second provider of the Donga group touched the
container for the first time in the fifth trial. Throughout the training phases,
the time required by the providers to open their container dropped quickly:
first providers, Donga group, from 35 min to 1 min, and Picnic group, from
120 min to 10 min; second providers, Donga group, from 55 min to 2 min,
and Picnic group, from 75 min to 10 min. None of the providers attempted
to open the container attributed to the other provider after the training
phase.
Statistical Tests. We give only combined probabilities for both groups when-
ever the same effects were found in both. Raw data and separate probability
estimates are given in Tables S1–S5. Rank order and linearity indexes were
determined with the MATMAN software (34), and all other computations
were made with MATHEMATICA 6.0 (52).
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